The Nash bargaining problem is considered as a one-shot decision problem by two expected-utility maximizers with beliefs in the form of probability distributions over the opponent's strategy choices. Assuming three conditions as axioms on the formation of beliefs of both players, we derive the Nash solution as the optimal decisions of the mutual maximization problems.
Introduction
The Nash bargaining solution, characterized as the utility-product maximization, can be derived in several ways; the well-established axiomatic approach and the noncooperative-game approach due originally to Nash [1950, 1953] , Bayesian negotiation models due to Harsanyi [1956 Harsanyi [ , 1977 , the probabilistic model of Anbar and Kalai [1978] , and a more recent, new axiomatization by Binmore [1984] from a viewpoint of convention of the bargaining.
Among these models, the one-shot probabilistic model of Anbar and Kalai [1978] derives the Nash solution as an optimal outcome of mutual expectedutility maximization. In their model, the two players are assumed to have beliefs over the opponents' strategy sets in the form of cumulative probability distribution functions, and choose the strategies that maximize the expected utilities. Their main result is a complete characterization of the pairs of beliefs that generate Pareto optimal outcomes for all feasible sets of utilities. The Nash solution is obtained for each feasible set of utilities i f the pair of beliefs is given by the uniform distribution.
The question to be raised here is that what is the rationale for the players to have particular beliefs in the one-shot bargaining situation, without which the justification of the Nash solution through such a probabilistic modelltlOuld not be complete. There is a critical discussion that such a probabilistic model lacks a theory of how players come to draw particular beliefs (see, Roth [1979] ).
In this paper, we shall try to justify a particular formation of beliefs in the one-shot bargaining situation, and derive the Nash solution thereby.
In doing so, we do not assume the beliefs to be invariant for all feasible sets of utilities. This would be a desirable prerequisite, since the formation of beliefs will in general depend on the given feasible set of utilities.
Instead, we assume that the beliefs are invariant only for all feasible sets which are near-enough to a given one. This assumption may be justified as a slight imperfection or insensitivity inherent in the mechanism of forming beliefs; namely, small-enough differences in the feasible sets cannot be reflected in the formation of beliefs, so that players may continue to hold the same beliefs if such a perturbation of the Pareto surface should occur.
The perfect mechanism is the one that can be reached only through imperfect ones by reducing tlie degree of imperfectness (insensitivity).
A correspondence that associates to each bargaining game a nonempty set of pairs of beliefs will be called a mechanism of forming beliefs. Three requirements will be imposed, as axioms, on the mechanism. The first axiom states that the mechanism should generate those pairs of beliefs which are optimality-consistent; namely, each pair should generate a unique Pareto optimal payoff vector as a result of mutual expected-utility maximization.
Secondly, we require that the resulting Pareto optimal payoff vector should be belief-compatible in the sense that it is most probable as an outcome of the game under the pair of beliefs. We call this property the outcome beliefcompatibility. The third axiom is a formal statement of the above mentioned imperfectness property that the mechanism is insensitive to small-enough -differences i.n the feasible sets. The treatment of beliefs due to Anbar and Kalai [1978] corresponds to the case where the insensitivity is global; that is, the mechanism is insensitive to any variation of the feasible set in the uni t square.
With these conditions on the mechanism, we derive a necessary condit:ion for a pair (E',G) of beliefs to satisfy. It will be shown that (F,G) 
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The basic bargaining game and the maximization problem of each player are stated in the next section. In Section 3, we give the motivation and definitions of the requirements, and state the theorem. Finally, in Section 4, we give the proof of the theorem.
The Model
The bargaining game considered in this paper is a pair (S,c), where S ~s the set of feasible payoff vectors and c is the conflict payoff vector.
We assume:
(a) S is a compact, convex subset of the unit square, Consider, hereafter, the bargaining game (s,c) as one played by expectedutility maximizers. That is, each player is assumed to have a belief about the opponent's choices in the form of a probability distribution over the strategy set of the opponent. So, let F and G be cumulative probability distributLm functions over Band A. respectively. By F(y), we express the belief of player 1 that player 2 's strategy choice is less than or equal to y, and G(x), the belief of player 2 that player 1 's strategy choice is less than or equal to x.
By choosing suitably two continuous, concave non-increasing functions 1)!(x) and ~(y) on A and B, respectively, S can be represented by
Let 
Note that there always exists an (F,G)-optimal point. We say a point 
Plausible Beliefs
As assumed in the previous section, each player is an expected-utility maximizer. They know each other that the opponent is also an expected-utility maximizer. To be consistent with this knowledge, therefore, each player must take into account the belief which the opponent might have over his choice of strategies. Thus, each player must assume a pair of beliefs; one for his opponent's choices, and the other for his own choices which he thinks the Copyright © by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. We call f the mechanism of forming beliefs and interpret (F,G) to be
The first requirement of f is the following.
Axiom 1. (Optimality-Consistency). Let SEE and let (F,G)Ef(S). Then (F,G) is optimality-consistent.
This axiom simply requires that a plausible pair of beliefs should be one that generates a Pareto optimal outcome. Each player must consider which pair of beliefs is plausible. But, whatever it may be, it would be irrational for each player to assume a pair that does not generate a Pare to optimal outcome. 
If (XS,yS)EP(S), then there exists no point (x,y)EP(S) such that

F(y)G(x) > F(yS)G(x S ).
To motivate this axiom, consider any point (x,y)E p(S
F(y)G(x).
Thus, Axiom 2 requires that a plausible pair (F,G) should be one with the property that the (F,G)-optimal point (xS,yS) is compatible with the maximal probability of obtaining the point (xS,yS) as the outcome of the game. In this case, we say the (F,GjS)-optimal point is belief-compatible.
The outcome belief-compatibility may be justified in our scenario, because in the one-shot situation any player cannot revise the belief at all so that he must rely on the belief the outcome by which he thinks is most probable.
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Nash Bargaining Solution
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To state the last condition, we need some notations. Let SEl: be given fixed, and let £>0 be a sufficiently small number. Consider, then, the sub- 
Then, there exists £>0 such that for any TEl: (£), (F,G) Ef(T).
Axiom 3 states that the mechanism of forming beliefs may have a slight imperfection or inertia such that once a particular belief is formed, it cannot be sensitive to small-enough differences from the given feasible set S.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, it would be a realistic characterization to assume the imperfectness as an inherent nature of the mechanism. The perfect mechanism is the one corresponding to the limit when the degree of the imperfectness, i.e., £>0, tends to :~ero.
We can now state our theorem. The proof will be given in the next section. In Figure 1 , we illustrate Theorem 1. This theorem implies in particular that any pair (F,G) such that
h with h>l is not in £(S), though it satisfies Axiom 1.
Theorem 1 gives a necessary condition for a pair (F,G) to be in f(S).
It imposes no restriction on the beliefs away from the neighborhood of the Copyright © by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. Figure 1 An example of the class of pairs of beliefs satisfying axioms 1 and 2
would be one consisting of all (F,G) such that for all TEl:(e:), the Nash
for all yE B, and
for all x EA.
The proof is straightforward, and it can be seen that any pair in this class has the necessary linear portion around the Nash solution. Then, the point (x*,1jJ(x*» is the Nash solution for (S,c).
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Proof: Let us denote the differentiation by the prime. Then, by differentiating at )(=x*, it follows from Axiom 1 that
Also, by differentiating at x=x*, it follows from Axiom 2 that
Note that, by Lemma 1, we have
Then (1) and (3) imply
By Lemma 1 we have G(x*»O, so that (4) and (2) imply
But, this imp lies that the point (x*,1jJ (x*» is the Nash so lut ion.
Proposition 1 shows that with the differentiability, axioms 1 and 2 are enough to obtain the result. 
